Social Accountability Theory
http://www.madman-bbs.net/nails/shotter.htm
 |
“In joint actions between them, people
constitute background situations in which they are
accountable to each other in terms related to
those situations. Indeed, it is in being accountable
to each other in their situation’s terms
that they sustain ‘it’ in existence.” — Shotter, In conversation: joint action, shared intentionality and ethics, Theory and psychology, 1995, 5(1): p. 55. |
|
“The basic elements
of a social order must not only know what they are doing,
they must also be able to account for their action,
as well as knowing how to correct mistakes, redeem
themselves, acquit themselves, make reparations,
and so on.” — Vico, joint action, moral worlds and personhood, in Shotter, Social accountability and selfhood, 1984, p. 148. |
|
“A Vichian social psychology would not be
concerned with discovering theoretical principles, but
with the practical tast of moving on to new forms of
human being; with people actually discovering
within themselves how to exercise new powers of mind
— and how to avoid being bewitched by linguistic
and theoretical constructs of their own making.” — Vico, joint action, moral worlds and personhood, in Shotter, Social accountability and selfhood, 1984, p. 135. |
|
“In their conversational
talk with each other, in being answerable for their
own stance within the conversation, and in needing
to address themselves to the others around them,
speakers must, morally, take account of their
situation in their moment-by-moment voicing
of their talk.” — Shotter, Harré, Vygotsky, Bakhtin, Vico, Wittgenstein: academic discourses and conversational realities, Journal for the theory of social behaviour, 1993, 23(4): p. 474. |
John Shotter’s Homepage
The Virtual Faculty
John Shotter’s Publications
