“Learning is in urgent need to be ’undefined’,” is one of the orienting statements for this
symposium. “There is a need to rethink research in light of the ‘undefinition’ of learning beyond
the boundaries of instructional processes,” is another. Toward the aim implied in these
statements, I want in what follows to explore – and to put into dialogue with each other, so to
speak – the work of a group of philosophers and other writers on language and life. Mainly, I
will draw from Wittgenstein, Voloshinov, Bakhtin, and Merleau-Ponty, who all in their own
different ways, focus on the primacy of our living, spontaneously responsive reactions to the
others and othernesses around us, rather than taking the thoughts or theories of individuals as an
original source of new activities in our lives. As Wittgenstein (1980) puts it: “The origin and the
primitive form of the language game is,” he says, “a reaction; only from this can more
complicated forms develop. Language - I want to say - is refinement, ‘in the beginning was the
deed’ (quoting Goethe)’” (p.31). Whilst elsewhere he remarks: “Our attitude to what is alive and
to what is dead, is not the same. All our reactions are different” (1953, no.284). Rather than on
what is supposed as occurring in some hidden way within us, so that we must approach it
indirectly, in terms of hypotheses and theories, this focus on our spontaneous, living, differential
responsiveness to the otherness around us, and on our immediate, ‘inner’, felt experience of it, is
crucial. For there is something very special in people’s living, bodily presence to each other that
is not properly acknowledged in our current modernist, mechanistic ways of making sense of our
world.
As Merleau-Ponty (1968) puts it in his The Visible and the Invisible: “In a sense, if we
were to make completely explicit the architectonics of the human body, its ontological
framework, and how it sees itself and hears itself, we would see that the structure of its mute
world is such that all the possibilities of language are already given in it. Already our existence
as seers (that is, we said, as beings who turn the world back upon itself and who pass over to the
other side, and who catch sight of one another, who see one another with eyes) and especially
our existence as sonorous beings for others and for ourselves contain everything required for
there to be speech from the one to the other, speech about the world. And, in a sense, to
understand a phrase is nothing else than to fully welcome it in its sonorous being, or, as we put it
so well, to hear what it says (l'entendre). The meaning is not on the phrase like the butter on the
bread, like a second layer of “copy reality” spread over the sound: it is the totality of what is
said, the integral of all the differentiations of the verbal chain; it is given with the words for those
who have ears to hear” (p.155). In what follows below, I shall explore the special nature of our
spontaneous, bodily responsiveness to events in our surroundings, and the many implications it
has for how we must re-think the process of learning in our lives. Rather than merely causal or
rational, our relations to our surroundings are, I shall argue, dialogically-structured.
This, as we shall see, changes completely the way in which we make sense of many terms
of importance to us in our conduct of our daily human affairs. In particular, such terms as
learning, understanding, knowing, communicating, meaning, organizing, etc. – they all will have
to be used in a wholly new way; or, to put it differently, they will all have to be used in a very
old, participative manner, a manner which in the past was thought of as ‘primitive’ (Levy-Bruhl,
1926).